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I
n recent years, policymakers have proposed
various fiscal policies to spur long-run eco-
nomic growth through increased capital for-
mation. The Bush Administration, for example,
proposed lowering the capital gains tax rate. The
Clinton Administration, among other measures
in its economic package, proposed reinstituting
the investment tax credit. These proposals stem
from heightened concerns that the U.S. economy
has been growing by less than its long-run poten-
tial, and from the judgment that this subpar growth
is due in part to deficient capital formation. 
This article presents a framework for exam-
ining fiscal policies aimed at spurring capital
formation and highlights the conditions for their
success. The first section shows why capital for-
mation is an important determinant of economic
growth. The second section shows how the opti-
mal amount of capital formation, and therefore
economic growth, is determined. The third sec-
tion shows how economic distortions can cause
capital formation to fall short of the socially
optimal amount. The final section discusses sev-
eral fiscal policies that have been proposed to
raise capital formation.
CAPITAL FORMATION AND LONG-RUN
GROWTH
Capital formation refers to the increase in the
capital stock that results from investment spend-
ing.
1 Capital formation also includes improve-
ments in the quality of capital. For example, the
development of faster personal computers also
represents capital formation.
Capital formation increases per capita output
by making workers more productive. For exam-
ple, the substitution of typewriters for penman-
ship enhanced the productivity of office workers.
The substitution of word processors for typewrit-
ers, in turn, has further raised office worker pro-
ductivity. Because capital formation increases
output per worker, the greater the amount of
capital formation, the greater will be the growth
rate of per capita output.
The standard theory of economic growth pio-
neered by Robert Solow suggests policies that
raise capital formation cannot permanently raise
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pare the article.the growth rate of per capita output. The key
assumption in the standard model is diminishing
marginal returns to capital formation. Diminish-
ing marginal returns means each successive unit
of capital adds less and less to a worker’s total
output. For example, giving an office worker a
word processor will greatly improve perform-
ance, but giving the same worker a second word
processor will have little additional effect on
performance. Due to diminishing returns, as firms
acquire more and more capital, the return to
capital declines until it just equals the cost of
capital. As a result, capital formation will
eventually  stop, and there will be no growth of
per capita output in the long run. In other
words, policies aimed at raising capital forma-
tion can raise growth in the short run but not in
the long run.
2
In contrast to the standard theory, empirical
evidence suggests there is a positive long-run
relationship between capital formation and per
capita growth (Chart 1). Chart 1 is a scatterplot
of capital formation and economic growth. Capi-
tal formation is measured by domestic real gross
investment’s share of real GDP. Economic growth





Note:  Economic growth is measured by the growth rate of per capita real GDP.  Investment is measured by domestic real gross
investment’s share of real GDP.  The chart shows average annual economic growth rates and investment for 52 countries.
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from Summers and Heston.























































60 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYcapita real GDP. The scatterplot includes 52
countries for which data are available from 1950
to 1988. In order to measure long-run growth and
investment, the data point for a particular country
represents the average of annual observations
over the whole sample.
3 Because countries with
low income levels tend to grow faster than coun-
tries with high income levels, the data were purged
of the effect of the initial level of income.
4
Chart 1 shows that countries that invest more
tend to have higher long-run rates of economic
growth.
5 The average relationship is summarized
on the chart by a regression of growth on invest-
ment. The regression line has a positive slope,
which is statistically significant and economi-
cally important.
6 According to the regression, an
increase of ten percentage points in the invest-
ment share of GDP is associated with an increase
of 1.3 percentage points per year in the long-run
growth rate of per capita real GDP.
7
In response to the inconsistency of the em-
pirical evidence with the standard growth model,
new theories of growth have emerged in recent
years.
8 In the new theories, policies aimed at
raising capital formation can raise growth in the
long run. The critical feature of the new theo-
ries is that the return to capital for the economy
as a whole does not diminish because capital is
assumed to have a direct effect on an individual
firm’s output and an indirect effect on the output
of other firms. As in the standard model, the
direct effect of capital on a business firm’s
output exhibits diminishing returns. In con-
trast to the standard model, however, increases
in a firm’s capital also indirectly affect the output
of other firms in the economy by increasing such
factors as the stock of knowledge and the
education of the work force. For example, invest-
ment by a handful of firms in personal computer
technology produced knowledge that allowed many
other firms to manufacture personal computers.
As long as the indirect effect is sufficiently strong,
the return to capital for the economy as a whole
does not diminish. Without the constraint of dimin-
ishing returns, policies aimed at spurring capital
formation can raise growth in the long run.
WHAT IS THE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL FORMATION?
While the new growth theories imply a con-
structive role for economic policy in raising
growth, they do not imply that policy should
focus on attaining the highest possible rates of
growth and capital formation. Because capital
formation requires foregoing current consump-
tion, raising economic growth is not always in
society’s best interest. This section shows what
determines the socially optimal amount of capi-
tal formation in the absence of economic distor-
tions. The next section discusses how economic
distortions cause capital formation to fall short
of the social optimum.
Capital formation depends on the demand
for and supply of funds (Figure 1). To concen-
trate on the essential elements determining capi-
tal formation, Figure 1 excludes the role played
by government in capital markets and focuses on
the private demand for and supply of funds. The
demand for funds is represented by the demand
for investment goods (I) by firms. The invest-
ment schedule relates a firm’s investment spend-
ing to interest rates (R). Along the schedule, other
factors that affect investment are held constant,
such as production techniques, the market envi-
ronment in which goods are sold, and the level
of business confidence.
9
The investment schedule shows that investment
spending increases as the interest rate falls. The
downward slope of the investment schedule follows
from the assumption that, when faced with an
array of projects, firms will first invest in the
most profitable ventures. Because the initial pro-
jects are more profitable, firms are willing and
able to pay a higher interest rate to borrow funds.
As investment continues, the returns from the
remaining projects decline. As a result, firms will
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1994 61invest in them only at a lower interest rate. Thus,
whether a project is attractive cannot be deter-
mined without reference to the prevailing interest
rate.
The supply of funds is represented by the
desired saving of households.
10 The saving
schedule (S) relates household saving to the level
of interest rates. Along the saving schedule, other
household characteristics that affect saving are
held constant. These characteristics include the
level and variability of income, age, marital
status, the expected inflation rate, and the access
of foreigners to U.S. capital markets.
11 
The saving schedule shows that desired sav-
ing increases with interest rates. The response of
saving to an increase in the interest rate is more
complicated than in the case of investment be-
cause households are affected by two forces that
pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, an
increase in the interest rate today will raise the
return on previous savings, raising the amount of
funds available tomorrow. To the extent house-
holds have a target for the amount of funds
needed tomorrow—for example, retirement—
this “income effect” will lower saving today. On
the other hand, the reward for saving increases
with the interest rate and, by itself, this “substi-
tution effect” will make households want to save
more. The relative importance of the income and
substitution effects on private saving is a topic of
much dispute. If these effects were equally po-
tent, saving would be completely unresponsive
= Capital formation }
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62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYto the interest rate, and the saving schedule
would be vertical. As shown in Figure 1, this
article assumes the saving schedule has a posi-
tive slope, reflecting the assumption that the
substitution effect dominates the income effect.
The intersection of the investment and sav-
ing schedules determines the market equilibrium
amount of capital formation (denoted by the “M”
superscript in Figure 1). At the intersection, there
is a unique interest rate, R
M, that equates the
amount of investment willingly undertaken by
firms and the amount of saving willingly under-
taken by households (I
M=S
M=capital formation).
In equilibrium, capital formation will remain
unchanged unless the investment or saving
schedules are disturbed by a change in one or
more of the underlying factors—for example,
changes in business confidence or expected in-
flation.
This market equilibrium corresponds to the
socially optimal amount of capital formation
when the saving and investment schedules accu-
rately represent all of the benefits and costs of
capital formation. An important assumption in
economics is that households and firms will
make decisions in their own self interest. In the
context of saving and investment, households
will choose to save and firms will choose to
invest in a way that maximizes their own bene-
fits. When the saving and investment schedules
are not distorted, these individual decisions will
also determine the most favorable amount of
capital formation from society’s perspective in
the sense that no other outcome would lead to a
higher level of satisfaction. In other words, in the
absence of economic distortions, the market
equilibrium amount of capital formation equals
the socially optimal amount of capital formation




The amount of capital formation determined
by the market is socially optimal only in a world
free of economic distortions. In the actual economy,
economic distortions cause the market-determined
amount of capital formation to fall short of the
socially optimal amount. This section considers
three sources of distortions: capital income taxa-
tion, government budget deficits, and externalities.
13
Capital income taxation  
The need for revenues and considerations of
fairness have led governments to tax the income
from capital assets. Capital income taxation distorts
the saving and investment schedules, causing the
amount of capital formation determined by the market
to fall short of the amount that is socially optimal.
14
Capital taxes on households reduce the bene-
fits of saving because they lower the post-tax
return earned by households (Figure 2).
15 House-
holds’ capital income is taxed in a number of
ways. Periodic dividend and interest payments
are taxed at a rate depending on the households’
adjusted gross income. Capital gains are taxed
when assets are sold, even if the gain merely
reflects the effects of inflation. Such taxes reduce
households’ returns. As a result, households re-
quire a higher pre-tax return to supply a given
amount of saving, which is shown in Figure 2 as
an upward shift in the saving schedule to S
T.
Capital taxes on households create a market
shortfall in capital formation.
16 With the shift
from S to S
T, the return required by households
is greater than the return to investing at the initial
amount of capital formation. To satisfy the
higher interest rate required by savers, firms
must cut back their investment projects to those
with higher returns. In this new equilibrium, capi-
tal formation is less than the socially optimal
amount.
17
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1994 63Capital taxes levied directly on firms also
lead to a market shortfall, but by reducing the net
return to investment rather than to saving. For
example, taxes are assessed on business profits
after allowance has been made for production
and financing costs. These and other capital in-
come taxes reduce the net returns earned by firms
on all investments. This reduction in returns is
represented in Figure 3 (which removes the ef-
fects of any household taxes) as a downward shift
in the investment schedule from I to I
T. With the
shift to I
T, the return to investing is less than the
return required by households at the initial
amount of capital formation. Consequently,
firms must cut back their investment projects to
those with higher returns, which creates a market
shortfall relative to the social optimum.
18
The degree to which capital income taxation
creates a market shortfall in capital formation
depends critically on the slopes of the saving and
investment schedules. For example, suppose the
saving schedule is nearly flat because saving is
very responsive to interest rates. In this case,
taxing households’ capital income would have a
large effect on capital formation. On the other
hand, if the investment demand schedule is very
steep, then, even if the saving schedule is as
pictured in the figures, shifts in the saving sched-
ule would have only a modest effect on the
equilibrium amount of capital formation. Unfor-
tunately, no consensus has yet to emerge on the

















64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYGovernment budget deficits  
The size of the federal government budget
deficit has been a major topic on the policy
agenda for a number of years. Government deficits
create a shortfall in private capital formation by
reducing the pool of saving available for private
sector borrowers, thus “crowding out” private
capital formation (Figure 4). To the extent that
deficits are not used for investment purposes,
total capital formation is reduced.
19 An important
feature of government borrowing is that it is
insensitive to interest rates. That is, the govern-
ment will borrow whatever it needs to finance its
deficit no matter what the interest rate because
its budget deficits are always financed. As a
result, deficits reduce the funds available for
private capital formation, and the saving sched-
ule shifts leftward from S to S
D. This shift equals
the size of the deficit. With the shift from S to S
D,
the return to investing is less than the return
required by households at the initial amount of
capital formation. Faced with a higher required
return, firms are now more selective in choosing
projects and cut back their investment. At the
new equilibrium, private investment is crowded
out, reducing capital formation below the so-
cially optimal level.
The size of the shortfall in capital formation
due to government deficits depends on the slopes
of the saving and investment schedules, as
well as on two other key and controversial
assumptions. First, because current deficits
















ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1994 65households might increase their saving some-
what to help pay the higher taxes. In that case,
the saving schedule would lie between S
D and S
in Figure 4. In the extreme, if households in-
creased their saving by enough to fully pay off
future taxes, government deficits would have
no effect on capital formation.
20
The second factor that might mitigate the
effects of government deficits is international
capital flows. To the extent that funds flow across
national borders, the higher interest rates in-
duced by government deficits would attract for-
eign funds, replacing the funds lost to the
government. In the extreme case of perfectly
integrated world capital markets, international
capital flows would surge whenever domestic
interest rates differed from world interest rates,
and the differential between the two rates would
disappear quickly. As a result, government defi-




A key assumption in the analysis of the so-
cially optimal amount of capital formation is that
firms and households realize all of the costs and
benefits associated with their investment and

















66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYwhen households or firms do not realize all of the
benefits created by their actions. Externalities
are another type of distortion that creates a mar-
ket shortfall in capital formation.
22 
Positive externalities may exist in capital
formation. Indeed, such positive externalities are
one of the key assumptions in many of the new
growth theories. Some empirical evidence indicates
that investment in machinery and equipment
plays a particularly pivotal role in stimulating
growth through learning externalities or as a
stimulant to innovation. For example, calcula-
tions by DeLong and Summers indicate that the
social return to investment in machinery and
equipment is much higher than the private return,
perhaps as high as 30 percent. 
Other types of investment may also generate
positive externalities. Some have argued that
small firms generate benefits in the form of new
ideas and new jobs in excess of the returns accru-
ing to entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
Viewed from the perspective of the aggregate
economy, capital formation by small firms yields
social benefits that exceed private benefits. In
these and other cases, investment generates a
positive externality not appreciated fully by pri-
vate market participants.
Positive externalities produce a market
shortfall in capital formation (Figure 5). If in-
vestment produces a positive externality, then
the socially optimal investment schedule (I
E) lies
to the right of the investment schedule faced by
market participants (I). The I
E schedule shows
the amount of investment firms would undertake
if they considered both the private and external
benefits from investing. At a given interest rate,
firms would be willing to invest more if they
actually faced this hypothetical investment
schedule. Thus, the socially optimal amount of
capital formation—the intersection of I
E and S—
exceeds the private market outcome, and there is
a market shortfall in capital formation. 
POLICIES TO SPUR CAPITAL
FORMATION
The distortions that produce shortfalls in
capital formation, and therefore in economic
growth, suggest a natural framework for assess-
ing policies to spur capital formation. Specifi-
cally, policies should be evaluated by the extent
to which they reduce the distortions that disrupt
capital formation.
23 It is often difficult to evalu-
ate policies, however, because policies that re-
duce one distortion often produce other
distortions as side effects.
24 This section dis-
cusses four of the more popular policies that have
been proposed to raise capital formation and iden-
tifies some of the side effects that might accom-
pany them.
Reducing the federal budget deficit
Deficit reduction has been the policy action
receiving the most recent attention for stimulat-
ing capital formation. The federal deficit has
swelled since the late 1970s, rising from just 11
percent of private saving in the latter half of the
1970s to 31 percent in 1992. The focus on deficit
reduction is in response to the widely held view
that high (and growing) federal budget deficits
increase competition for the scarce pool of pri-
vate saving, raise interest rates, and crowd out
private investment (Figure 4). Viewed in isola-
tion, reducing the budget deficit will raise capital
formation if the absorption of resources by the
government is a major distortion.
The extent to which a lower deficit will raise
capital formation, however, depends on how the
reduction is financed. For example, suppose the
deficit is reduced by raising capital income taxes
on households and firms. Raising capital income
taxes will lower the post-tax return to saving by
households (Figure 2) or investment by firms
(Figure 3). Thus, tax financing magnifies one
distortion and, all else being the same, lowers
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1994 67capital formation. 
The way deficit reduction is financed can
also affect the distribution of capital formation
across different markets. For example, a tax
change that discourages investment in residen-
tial real estate will have a favorable effect on the
market for business plant and equipment, as in-
vestors withdraw some of their funds from the
relatively less attractive housing market. 
The existence of multiple effects is common
in evaluating public policies. An analysis of mul-
tiple effects is similar to that contained in the
above figures, except that many markets would
be considered simultaneously and the saving and
investment schedules in each market would de-
pend on circumstances in other markets. Reduc-
ing the deficit to stimulate capital formation is
based on the judgment that the response to lower
interest rates is sufficiently strong to counteract
the effects of higher capital income taxes. 
Reinstituting the investment tax credit
The investment tax credit has been a fre-
quently used instrument of tax policy. An invest-
ment tax credit subsidizes investment by
allowing businesses to deduct a percentage of
their investment from their taxes.
25 Starting in the
1960s, the investment tax credit has been set at
various rates, removed, resurrected retroactively,
and then eliminated completely in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986. Reinstituting the investment
















68 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtion’s initial economic proposal to Congress, but
it was not part of the 1993 budget bill enacted
into law. 
A key motivation for an equipment invest-
ment tax credit is the evidence suggesting there
are positive externalities associated with equip-
ment investment that benefit the entire economy
(Figure 5). In the presence of such externalities,
business equipment investment will fall short of
its socially optimal amount. Thus, subsidizing
this type of capital formation is the appropriate
policy.
26
As with deficit reduction, financing the in-
vestment tax credit creates additional distortions
that temper capital formation. On the one hand,
if there is no compensating tax increase, the
budget deficit will rise. On the other hand, if the
subsidy is financed by increasing some other tax,
then there will be an additional distortion that
lowers capital formation. Subsidizing equipment
investment with a tax credit is based on the
judgment that the gains from exploiting the fa-
vorable externality exceed the costs from adding
distortions elsewhere in the economy.
Lowering the capital gains tax rate
The 1993 budget bill did not include an in-
vestment tax credit, but it did lower the capital
gains tax rate for specific types of saving. In
general, lowering taxes on capital gains in-
creases the return to savers. More specifically,
the capital gains tax cut in the 1993 budget bill
was targeted at savers that supply capital to small
businesses. This policy is motivated by the per-
ception that small businesses generate a positive
externality. In the presence of positive externali-
ties, capital formation by small businesses will
fall short of its socially optimal amount (Figure
5). Thus, a subsidy targeted at small business
capital formation is the appropriate policy. 
Choosing between a saving or investment
subsidy to stimulate small business capital for-
mation depends on several considerations. Be-
cause a given market shortfall in capital forma-
tion can be remedied by subsidizing either saving
or investment, it is unclear which subsidy is
appropriate. Thus, the choice of tax instrument
will depend on other considerations, such as ad-
ministrative simplicity, income redistribution,
political feasibility, or interactions with other
aspects of the tax code. The latter is perhaps most
important in choosing to lower capital gains tax
rates because many small firms will have little if
any profits with which to use an investment tax
credit. Since the investment tax credit is not
refundable, firms without any profits would ob-
tain no immediate benefit from an investment
credit. Targeting savers who can respond to the
incentives provided by a tax cut may be a much
more effective way of stimulating small business
capital formation.
The desirability of subsidizing small busi-
nesses by a targeted cut in the capital gains tax
rate is based on two judgments. First, lowering
the capital gains tax rate is the most effective tax
instrument for directing funds to small busi-
nesses. Second, as with the other policies consid-
ered above, the gains from exploiting the
favorable externality exceed the costs from add-
ing distortions that arise from financing the cut
in capital gains taxes. 
Replacing capital income taxation by
consumption taxation
Replacing the income tax with a consump-
tion tax is a policy favored by many economists.
The taxation of capital income retards capital
formation because, as illustrated in Figures 2 and
3, the returns to saving and investment are dis-
torted. If the taxation of capital income is the
problem, then the solution is simply to choose a
tax system that does not tax capital income.
Avoiding the taxation of capital income can
be accomplished by taxing only the income spent
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1994 69on consumption. A consumption tax can be im-
plemented in various ways. For example, ex-
panding the tax benefits of IRAs to all forms of
saving and eliminating the requirement that the
funds can be used only for retirement is one way
of replacing the income tax with a consumption
tax. Alternatively, the income tax could be re-
placed by imposing a national sales tax or na-
tional value-added tax. In all cases, the net effect
is to exempt income from taxation until it is used
for consumption. Concerns with equity and tran-
sition problems in moving from an income to a
consumption tax have resulted in only modest
political interest for this policy initiative.
27
CONCLUSIONS
Heightened concerns that the U.S. economy
has been growing by less than its long-run poten-
tial have spurred fiscal policy proposals to raise
long-run economic growth through increased capi-
tal formation. This article presents a framework
for examining fiscal policies aimed at raising
capital formation. Three sources of market short-
falls in capital formation are capital income taxes,
government budget deficits, and externalities as-
sociated with investment in capital goods. Given
these distortions, the ultimate success of growth-
oriented policies—such as deficit reduction, in-
vestment tax credits, capital gains tax rate cuts,
and consumption taxation—depends on whether
they reduce the economic distortions responsible
for the market shortfalls in capital formation. 
While the criterion for successful growth-
oriented policies is easy to articulate, it is more
difficult to evaluate because of interactions
among markets and uncertainties about the re-
sponsiveness of investment and saving to interest
rates and other factors. Quantitative analysis is
needed to get a firmer understanding of these
market interactions and empirical magnitudes
important in determining capital formation.
Nonetheless, the important lesson to be drawn
from this article is that public policy discussions
should focus on those distortions that disrupt the
capital formation process and are amenable to
policy actions.
ENDNOTES
1 In general, capital formation will be less than investment
because of depreciation, the amount of existing capital that
“disappears” due to normal wear and tear or to obsolescence
as technology improves. Depreciation is not considered in
this article because it would complicate the analysis without
changing any of the conclusions.
2 See Mankiw and Plosser for more complete discussions of
the Solow growth model and its policy implications.
3 The data are from Summers and Heston. The real invest-
ment share of real GDP was averaged over the years 1950
to 1988. The growth rate of per capita real GDP was aver-
aged over the years 1951 to 1988 because 1950 was the first
year the level of per capita real GDP was available. Guyana
was excluded from Chart 1 even though data were available
from 1950 to 1988 because it was clearly an outlier—the
average real investment share of real GDP was 31 percent
and the average growth rate of per capita real GDP was -0.7
percent. Including Guyana does not change the qualitative
results (see endnote 6).
4 The data were purged of the effect of the initial level of
income by regressing the average growth rate of per capita
real GDP (y) and the real investment share of real GDP (I)
on the initial level of per capita real GDP. The average of y
across countries was then added to the residuals from the
growth equation, and the average of I was added to the
residuals from the investment share equation. 
5 This discussion assumes that causality runs from invest-
ment to growth. Of course, part or all of the positive rela-
tionship between growth and investment may be because
there are more investment opportunities in countries with
strong economic growth. An example from industry that
demonstrates this point is the relative investment and growth
of Wal-Mart and Sears. Specifically, a high rate of invest-
ment probably is not the source of Wal-Mart’s growth rela-
70 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtive to Sears; rather, strong growth and the resulting invest-
ment opportunities probably are the source of Wal-Mart’s
high rate of investment. 
6 The coefficient on investment is 0.13 and is statistically 
significant at less than the 0.1 percent level. When Guyana
is included in the regression, the coefficient on investment
falls to 0.10 but is still statistically significant at less than the
0.1 percent level.
7 Some researchers believe that the evidence in Chart 1 does
not contradict the standard growth model because the aver-
age growth rates do not adequately represent long-run growth
(Mankiw, Romer, and Weil). Instead, they believe it can take an
economy more than 40 years to reach its long-run equilibrium
level of output. According to this view, the growth rates in
Chart 1 represent temporary differences in growth that occur
as the countries move toward their long-run equilibrium
level of per capita output. Thus, under this interpretation, the
evidence does not contradict the standard model’s prediction
that growth and the investment share are unrelated.
8 The new growth theories are called endogenous growth
theories because growth is generated “inside” the model
rather than “outside” the model as in the Solow model with
exogenous growth. See Plosser for a survey of the varieties
of endogenous growth models.
9 Chirinko provides a detailed analysis of the investment
schedule.
10 Firms also contribute to aggregate private saving but, for
the sake of expositional simplicity, their role is ignored. In
this article, all saving is done by households, and all invest-
ment is done by firms. 
11 Kotlikoff provides a detailed analysis of the saving
schedule.
12 The socially optimal amount of capital formation is
defined in terms of economic efficiency. This definition
ignores other factors, such as equity, the distribution of
resources, and other noneconomic factors, which may cause
society to desire a different amount of capital formation.
This article only focuses on economic efficiency, though
other considerations are important, if not paramount, in
deciding actual outcomes. See Rosen for a more complete
discussion of the complicated subject of welfare economics.
13 See Auerbach or Rosen for more detailed discussions of
the topics discussed in this section. Our analysis of market
shortfalls focuses on only private capital formation, thus
ignoring the role of and shortfalls in government infrastruc-
ture investment (for example, highways and roads, water and
sewer systems, mass transit networks, and airports). Recent
policy discussions (see Munnell) suggest that the govern-
ment has been insufficiently vigorous in funding public
infrastructure and, as a consequence, the social returns from
additional infrastructure investment are large. Thus, short-
falls amenable to policy actions may also exist with respect
to public capital formation. 
14 Given the complexity of the tax code, it is difficult to be
definitive about the impacts of capital income taxation on
capital formation. For example, while increasing the corpo-
rate income tax rate will usually lead to a decrease in
investment incentives, highly leveraged firms during infla-
tionary times may actually be tempted to increase invest-
ment because of the tax deductibility of nominal interest
payments. See Pechman or Rosen for an extended discussion
of various tax provisions.
15 These returns must be compared to those available from
other assets (for example, housing). Decreases in the returns
on alternative assets (perhaps due to changes in tax rates)
will shift the supply curve downward.
16 The analysis in this section focuses on just the immediate
effect of taxation. A more detailed analysis would take into
account that the extra tax revenues obtained from savers
could be used to reduce taxes elsewhere in the economy.
These additional factors are discussed below when evaluat-
ing policies to spur growth. 
17 “Market shortfalls” should be distinguished from the
related concept of “capital shortages.”  In many discussions,
“capital shortages” refer to an excess demand for investment
relative to the supply of saving. However, as shown in Figure
1, such a “shortage” would be eliminated in a market econ-
omy by movements of the interest rate until all market
participants were satisfied. However, insofar as “capital
shortages” refer to a divergence between the market equilib-
rium and the social optimum, then it is similar to the “market
shortfalls” concept used in this article.
18 The “market shortfalls” displayed in Figures 2 and 3 are
identical. This equality follows from the result in the public
finance literature that the incidence of the tax—in terms of
equilibrium values for the interest rate (net of the tax) and
capital formation—is the same whether levied on house-
holds or firms. 
19 While the deficit may affect the economy in a variety of
ways, the focus here is on the role of deficits in creating a
shortfall in private capital formation. Among other impor-
tant issues about the deficit not discussed here are how it
should be measured, its effects on current macroeconomic
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1994 71activity, and its consequences for future generations. See
Eisner and Friedman for further discussion of these issues.
The text also ignores that government spending may be
directed toward socially worthwhile ends (for example, aiding
flood victims in the Midwest) or investment in public infrastruc-
ture (for example, roads and bridges). Consequently, Figure 4
contains only a partial analysis of the effects of deficits. 
20 That forward-looking households completely anticipate
future taxes to pay for today’s deficit and increase saving
appropriately is labeled the “Ricardian Equivalence” propo-
sition. This proposition is named after the classical econo-
mist David Ricardo (who did not believe that it would hold
as an empirical proposition), and has been introduced into
recent debates about the deficit by Robert Barro. See B.
Douglas Bernheim for a critical review of the theory and
evidence for Ricardian Equivalence.
21 The empirical debate over capital mobility was initiated
by Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka, who concluded
that capital was relatively immobile and hence domestic
saving was important for domestic capital formation. This
conclusion is as controversial as it is crucial. See Feldstein
and Bacchetta for some recent evidence.
22 Frequently proposed solutions to externalities are for the
government to modify market incentives or impose regula-
tions. Economists prefer the former solution because it at-
tacks the externality problem directly by exploiting
economic incentives. Some have argued that externalities do
not require government intervention and that self-interested
individuals can reach an efficient outcome once property
rights are established. This solution, introduced by Ronald
Coase, becomes less applicable the more substantial are
negotiating costs and the less reliable and more restricted the
flow of pertinent information. 
23 As noted above, the reader should bear in mind that the
impacts of the three distortions on capital formation depend
on several assumptions that are implicit in the figures, espe-
cially the slopes of the demand and supply schedules. 
24 A complete evaluation would require a quantitative analy-
sis of market interactions and the empirical responsiveness
of saving and investment to changes in interest rates and
other factors. In addition, when the economy has multiple
distortions, removing one capital market distortion may not
necessarily lead to an improvement in the welfare of the
economy. In light of these “second best” considerations,
piecemeal changes in the tax code are generally undesir-
able and need to be evaluated in a more detailed model
than is presented in the figures. 
25 There are two general types of investment tax credits. A
unilateral credit applies to all equipment investment and has
been the method adopted in previous U.S. legislation. An
incremental investment tax credit applies to all equipment
investment above a prespecified level of past expenditures.
While both types of tax credits provide an incentive to
increase investment, the government loses less revenue from
the incremental credit.
26 Since it is unlikely that each type of equipment capital
will generate the same level of externalities, the argument in
the text suggests that the investment credit should vary
across equipment types. While such variation may be the
correct policy in principle, administrative and political con-
cerns might dictate a uniform investment credit in practice.
27 See McClure and Zodrow, and Miller for further discussion
of the difficulties in implementing a consumption tax system.
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